

Closure, Warrant Transmission, and Defeat

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1. Introduction

According to ‘classical dogmatism,’ the transmission principle for warrant holds unrestrictedly (e.g. Pryor 2004, 2012); nevertheless, Moorean-style anti-sceptical arguments fail dialectically: while propositional warrant transmits, the sceptic is rationally obscured from coming to believe the conclusion of Moore’s argument in virtue of psychological higher-order defeat.

In contrast, ‘radical dogmatism’ (e.g. Williamson 2000, 2007) claims that nothing is wrong with the Moorean argument, and charges the sceptic with epistemic malfunction for resisting it.¹

This paper argues that both extant dogmatisms remain unsatisfactory and develops a novel dogmatist view, in conjunction with a knowledge-centric proper functionalist account of defeat. The view falls squarely within the radical dogmatist camp, in that it holds that warrant transmits unrestrictedly through competent deduction and there is nothing wrong – epistemically or dialectically - with Moore’s argument. Nevertheless, the account is superior to extant radical dogmatisms in explanatory power; it purports to explain both the precise variety of epistemic failure exhibited by the sceptic, and the intuition of reasonableness when it comes to the sceptic’s resistance to Moore’s argument. It does so in terms of epistemic functions and contrary-to-duty obligations.

In Section 2 I briefly outline the issue at stake and the dogmatist response. In #3 I discuss classical dogmatism and reject the defeat claim. In #4 I develop my own radical dogmatism, and in #5 I conclude.

2. Two Dogmatisms

Moore sees his hands in front of him and comes to believe that HANDS: ‘Hands exist.’ based on his extraordinarily reliable perceptual belief formation processes. Moore’s belief is warranted, if any beliefs are: Moore is an excellent believer. Indeed, Moore knows that hands exist. In spite of his laudable epistemic ways, Dretske (1971) thinks Moore shouldn’t feel free to do whatever it pleases him to do with this belief, epistemically speaking; in particular, in spite of his warranted belief that HANDS, Dretske thinks Moore should refrain from reasoning to some propositions he knows to be entailed

¹ Other dogmatist responses come from hinge epistemologists (e.g. Pritchard 2015) and are motivated by e.g. the thought that our doxastic attitudes towards hinge propositions such as ‘The external world exists’ are not beliefs, and thereby not the stuff that makes the proper target of closure and transmission principles. See e.g. (Jope 2019) and (Simion et al. 2019) for discussion.

by HANDS, such as, for instance, WORLD: ‘There is an external world.’ He thinks that’s because this is an instance of closure failure for knowledge: we don’t always know the stuff that we know our knowledge to entail. In better news, conversely, that’s why the sceptic is wrong to think that my not knowing that I’m not a brain in a vat implies that I don’t know any of the ordinary things I take myself to know.

Wright (2002, 2003, 2004) and Davies (2003, 2004) agree: Moore shouldn’t reason to WORLD from HANDS. However, that’s not because closure fails, but because the stronger principle of warrant transmission fails: the problem here, according to them, is not that we sometimes fail to know the stuff that we know is entailed by what we know. Rather, the issue is that the warrant Moore has for HANDS fails to transmit to WORLD. Compatibly, though, Moore may still be entitled to believe WORLD on independent grounds. If Moore is entitled to believe HANDS, then perhaps he must also be entitled to believe WORLD. But it doesn’t follow that his warrant to believe WORLD is his warrant to believe HANDS. Rather, it may be that Moore needed to be independently entitled to believe WORLD to believe with, if he were to be entitled to believe HANDS.

Many philosophers are on board with rejecting at least one of these principles – be it merely warrant transmission, or closure as well. At the same time, since closure and warrant transmission constitute a bedrock of our epistemic ways – indeed, crucial vehicles for expanding our body of knowledge – one cannot give them up without a working restriction recipe: if closure and warrant transmission don’t hold unrestrictedly, when do they hold? It is fair to say the jury is still out on this front, and a satisfactory restriction recipe does not seem to be within easy reach.²

That being said, several philosophers take the alternative route of resisting the failure claims altogether. Some resist the intuition that something fishy is going on in Moore’s argument, and thus fully dismiss the data: closure and warrant transmission are too important a theoretical tool to be abandoned on grounds of misguided intuitions. According to these people, scepticism is just an instance of cognitive malfunction: the sceptic’s cognitive system malfunctions in that it fails to get rid of her unjustified sceptical beliefs in favour of the justified Moorean conclusion. Call these people ‘radical dogmatists.’ Here is Williamson:

Our cognitive immunity system should be able to destroy bad old beliefs, not just prevent the influx of bad new ones. But that ability sometimes becomes indiscriminate, and destroys good beliefs too (2007: 681).

The majority reaction to this move, however, is that it is less than fair to the sceptic; indeed, this view (intuitively problematically) categorizes scepticism, without qualification, in the same normative boat with other epistemic malfunctions, such as, for instance, wishful thinking. It is undeniable, though, that in the case of the sceptic, but not in the case of the wishful thinker, we think that there is something reasonable – even if not quite right – about their resistance to Moore’s argument. This intuitive difference cries for an explanation.

At the other side of the dogmatism spectrum, we find ‘classical dogmatists’ (Pryor 2004, 20012); these philosophers accept both closure and transmission, and try to come up with alternative explanations of the data: i.e., with an alternative account of what is

² But see (Kelp 2019) for my favorite proposal.

intuitively amiss with Moore's argument. In the next section I look closer at the classical dogmatist explanation of this datum.

3. Against Classical Dogmatism

According to Jim Pryor (2004), while Moore is right to reason from HANDS to WORLD, he wouldn't be very convincing were he to do so in conversation with a sceptic. The problem behind the intuitive fishiness of his reasoning pattern is pragmatic, not epistemic: It is lack of dialectical force, not lack of warrant that's triggering the uneasiness intuition. In the cases of alleged failure of closure and/or transmission, warrant transmits, but the argument fails dialectically due to psychological higher-order defeat.³ The sceptic about WORLD will not be convinced by Moore's argument in its favour from HANDS. Here is Pryor:

For a philosopher with such beliefs [i.e. sceptical beliefs], it'd be epistemically defective to believe things just on the basis of her experiences—even if those experiences are in fact giving her categorical warrant to so believe" (2012, 286).

Why would it be thus epistemically defective? According to Pryor, the sceptic's unjustified sceptical beliefs rationally obstruct her from believing based on Moore's argument, via psychological defeat. In particular, Pryor thinks that Moore's argument gives the sceptic propositional justification for the conclusion, but it fails to generate doxastic justification, due to the psychological defeat generated by the sceptic's previously acquired sceptical beliefs. Since the sceptical beliefs are not justified, according to Pryor, they don't defeat the propositional justification generated by Moore's argument. They do, however, rationally obstruct the sceptic from justifiably believing the conclusion of Moore's argument, and in this they defeat the sceptic's doxastic justification.

The point then, in a nutshell, is that even though it transmits warrant, the Moorean argument fails to convince the rational sceptic in virtue of the conflict between the Moorean claims and the sceptic's previously held beliefs. The sceptic has propositional justification, but does not have doxastic justification, for HANDS and WORLD.

In what follows, I'll take issue with this claim at several junctures. First and foremost, though, it is worth clarifying what exactly the content of the sceptical beliefs that allegedly do the defeating work here is. I want to start off by noting that it is implausible to think that the sceptical belief at stake in the literature is (or should be) something like non-WORLD: "The external world does not exist.". After all, what we are talking about - and the philosopher that is worth engaging with - is a reasonable sceptic, who e.g. believes in underdetermination - i.e. thinks that, for all he knows, he may well be a brain in a vat - , not someone who is anxiously fully confident that they're a brain in a vat. The reasonable sceptic that is worth engaging with thinks that, for all the evidence she has supports, there may well be no external world. If so, the reasonable sceptic will, at best, have a .5 credence that Non-WORLD, or else she will suspend belief on the issue. Not much will hang on

³ To my knowledge, the first to have introduced the category of psychological (/doxastic) defeat is Jennifer Lackey (e.g. 2006: 438). The first and now considered the classic view on the nature of defeat in epistemology is due to Pollock (1986). For recent work on defeat, see (Brown & Simion 2021).

this below, but since I am interested in being as charitable to classical dogmatist account as possible, I will, for the most part, discuss the reasonable sceptic rather than the maximally anxious sceptic in what follows. Everything I will say, though, will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the anxious sceptic as well.

Now here is a widely endorsed thesis in philosophy: justification is normative. The following is an attractive way of capturing this thought: One's ϕ -ing is *prima facie* practically, morally, epistemically, etc. justified if and only if one *prima facie* practically, morally, epistemically, etc. permissibly ϕ s. Plausibly enough, then, one's belief that p is epistemically justified if and only if one epistemically permissibly believes that p . Justifiers are considerations that support belief, in that, if all else goes well – i.e. proper basing, no defeat etc. – enough justifiers render a belief epistemically permissible.

Where does defeat fit in this picture? Just like justification, defeat is a normative category, in that it affects the permissibility of belief. Unlike justification, however, its function is to counter rather than support believing. If justifiers support belief – they contribute to rendering it permissible – defeaters contribute to rendering it impermissible. It is plausible, then, to think that defeat is the archenemy of justification: if justification is normative with a positive valence – in that it renders belief permissible – (full) defeat is normative with a negative valence, in rendering belief impermissible. In reasons-talk, if you wish, justifiers are normative reasons for belief, while defeaters are normative reasons against believing.

Now let's go back to Pryor's account of what goes on in the exchange between Moore and the sceptic. Recall: according to Pryor, even though Moore's argument does provide the sceptic with propositional justification, it fails to provide her with doxastic justification, in virtue of her unjustified sceptical beliefs defeating the latter, but not the former. As such, according to Pryor, the sceptic's belief that HANDS (and WORLD) based on Moore's argument would be rendered unjustified via defeat.

The problem with this picture is that it's not clear how an unjustified belief can have defeating force to begin with. To be clear, I am not claiming that we do not often resist information we are presented with because of our previously held unjustified beliefs. Indeed, we often resist information presented to us e.g. due to wishfully believing that it is not true (think, for instance, of cases of partisanship in virtue of friendship, or cases of people in abusive relationships that refuse to acknowledge the abuse etc.). The question at stake when it comes to defeat, though, is not one concerning the possibility of resistance to evidence, but of permissibility: since justification and defeat are normative, they can only be instantiated in cases in which permissibility is at stake. Cases of wishful thinking are paradigmatic cases in which the hearer is, to use Pryor's term, 'obscured' from believing information that is presented to them, due to their wishes. Clearly, though, wishful thinking cases are impermissibility cases: the hearer should not, as a matter of fact, resist the testimony in question, even though they do. Again, to follow Pryor's terminology, these are cases where the believer is not 'rationally obscured' from forming said beliefs, but merely 'obscured.' Or to put it in reasons terms, their unjustified, wishful thinking-based beliefs are *motivating* reasons for resisting testimony, but not *normative* reasons.

If all this is so, the question that arises is: is the sceptic being 'rationally obscured', as Pryor would have it, from adopting a belief based on Moore's testimony by her previously held unjustified sceptical beliefs, or rather, just like the wishful thinker, merely 'obscured' from so doing? Since defeat is a normative category, and

since, by Pryor's own stipulation, the sceptic's sceptical beliefs are unjustified, it would seem as though they do not qualify as defeaters proper, but rather as mere motivating reasons for resisting Moore's argument. The non-normative cannot defeat the normative: motivating reasons cannot outweigh normative reasons normatively. Just because I wish really hard to steal your purse, it does not follow that it is permissible to steal your purse: my motivating reasons, no matter how strong, in favour of stealing, cannot outweigh the moral reasons against stealing, since they don't factor into the overall permissibility calculus to begin with.

Why, then, is it intuitive, and according to Pryor, right to think that, once one has adopted a belief that non-p (or a doubt about whether p, or a .5 credence that non-p), it would be importantly epistemically defective to adopt a subsequent belief that p? Take the following standard case of higher order defeat: I come to believe that the walls in your studio are white but illuminated by a red light to look red. Subsequently, upon arriving at your studio, it seems problematic for me to adopt the belief 'The wall in front of me is red' based on my corresponding perceptual experience as of a red wall. Why is this so? In particular, why is it that, even if we stipulate that my initial belief that the wall is white and illuminated to look red is unjustified, it would seem that, now that I hold it, I shouldn't just trust my perceptual experience?

Maybe the answer to this question has something to do with the order in which the beliefs have been acquired; that is, maybe a difference in extant doxastic states is an epistemologically significant difference. Indeed, Pryor himself alludes to an answer along these lines. According to him, were the sceptic to believe based on Moore's testimony that HANDS, and thereby WORLD, her belief would be irrational, because it would not cohere with her previously held sceptical beliefs. According to Pryor, since irrationality precludes justification, were the sceptic to believe what Moore says, her belief would also be unjustified:

I will count a belief as rational when it's a belief that none of your other beliefs or doubts rationally oppose or rationally obstruct you from believing. [...]A rational commitment is a hypothetical relation between your beliefs; it doesn't "detach." That is, you can have a belief in P, that belief can rationally commit you to believe Q, and yet you be under no categorical requirement to believe Q. Suppose you believe Johnny can fly. This belief rationally commits you to the belief that someone can fly. If you're not justified in believing that Johnny can fly, though, you need not have any justification for the further belief. You may even have plenty of evidence and be fully justified in believing that no one can fly. But your belief that Johnny can fly still rationally commits you to the belief that someone can fly. Given your belief about Johnny, if you refrain from believing that someone can fly, you'll thereby exhibit a rational failing (Pryor 2004: 363-364).

Since rational failings are incompatible with justification, Pryor takes it that this hypothetical type of normativity that he associates with rationality – of the form 'if you believe that p, then you are rationally committed to believing that q' – will affect the permissibility of belief *tout court*: were the sceptic to believe what Moore tells her, her belief would be irrational – since she is antecedently committed to believing the opposite – and thereby unjustified.

There are two problems with this normative assessment, though. First and foremost, note that there are two ways of resolving cognitive dissonance due to holding two conflicting beliefs B1 and B2: one can either abandon B1, or B2. Coherence doesn't tell us which one we should choose: it merely tells us that one needs to go.⁴ There are two ways of proceeding in cases in which one is presented with information B2 that runs counter to one's extant belief B1: one can resist adopting B2, or, alternatively, one can abandon B1. Again, coherence doesn't recommend any particular course of action: it just tells us we need to choose between them.

One thing that Pryor could reply at this juncture is: time makes a difference, epistemically. The previously held belief takes precedence over the incoming information; this is what explains why the sceptic is rational to resist Moore's argument.

The question that arises at this stage, though, is: why should we think that time is of such devastating epistemological significance? Why is it, just because the sceptical belief precedes Moore's testimony temporally, that we should think that it also gets normative priority? After all consider the following pair of cases (adapted from Jessica Brown 2018):⁵

Case 1: A reliable testifier A, who knows that p, asserts that p. At the very same time as receiving A's testimony, the hearer also receives contrary testimony from another reliable testifier, B, that not-p.

Case 2: We slightly change Case 1 so that the testimony from B arrives just a bit later than the testimony from A, but for whatever reason the hearer does not form any belief about p before the testimony from B arrives.

In the cases, the evidentiary and doxastic situation is constant: one testimony item for, one against p, and no difference in mental states. Clearly, the time difference will not make any epistemic difference: in both Case 1 and Case 2, the hearer has equally strong evidence for and against p. She should suspend belief. But now consider:

Case 3: Differs from Case 2 only in the following respect: as a result of receiving A's testimony, the hearer forms the belief that p before receiving B's testimony.

Now note that there is no temporal difference between Case 2 and Case 3. As such, by the lights of the philosopher who believes that time can make an epistemic difference, there should be no difference in epistemic assessment either. But if there is no epistemic difference between Case 1 and 2, nor any epistemic difference between Case 2 and 3, it follows that there is no epistemic difference between Case 1 and Case 3 either. If so, what the hearer should do in both cases is suspend, rather than give priority to the first belief she formed and dismiss the second.

Let's take stock: we have seen that considerations pertaining to coherence cannot explain why we should think that the sceptic is rational to resist Moore's argument: coherence is indifferent between resisting Moore's argument and abandoning the previously held sceptical belief. We have also seen that time does not make an epistemic difference either. If so, just because a belief is antecedently held, it does not follow it takes epistemic priority. All of this suggests

⁴ See also (Simion 2020) and (Graham and Lyons 2021) for similar points.

⁵ See also (Goldberg 2021).

that the sceptic has no epistemic normative reason to give priority to her sceptical belief and thereby resist Moore's argument.

Furthermore, recall that on Pryor's view, Moore's argument is justification conferring, while the sceptical belief is unjustified. If so, there is epistemic normative reason for the sceptic to adopt the conclusion of Moore's argument, and *no* epistemic normative reason to hold on to the sceptical belief – albeit, of course, the sceptic may well have a merely motivating reason to do so. All in all, it would seem, the sceptic ought (epistemically) abandon her sceptical belief and adopt the conclusion of Moore's argument. The classical dogmatist solution to the sceptical puzzle is wrong: Moore's argument, while it may well often fail to convince the sceptic, that's not because it lacks dialectical power, but rather because the sceptic is epistemically impermissibly resisting its conclusion, in virtue of her previously held unjustified sceptical beliefs.

4. A New Radical Dogmatism

Let's take stock: we've seen that radical dogmatism – claiming that the sceptic's resistance to Moore's argument is an instance of epistemic malfunction – fails to offer a fully satisfactory explanation of the datum, in that it places the sceptic in the same boat with wishful thinkers, epistemically speaking. However, intuitively, we find the sceptic reasonable, even if wrong, when she resists Moore's inference.

Classical dogmatism does better on this front: according to these philosophers, the intuition of epistemic permissibility concerning the sceptic's resistance to Moore's argument is to be explained in terms of psychological defeat: Moore's argument is warrant conferring, but dialectically defective. Alas, on closer investigation, this account was shown to run into normative trouble: given that the sceptical belief is unjustified, it remains unclear why the sceptic should favour it over the warranted conclusion of the Moorean argument.

In what follows, I will develop a new dogmatism. My view falls squarely within the radical dogmatism camp, in that it takes transmission and closure to hold unrestrictedly, and finds no flaw – epistemic or dialectical – with Moore's argument. However, as opposed to extant radical dogmatisms, it does predict that there is something epistemically good about the sceptic's doxastic response, that sets it apart from believers merely displaying full-on cognitive malfunctions, such as wishful thinking.

Here is how I think about these things: Reasons are facts. They can, however, be facts about the world around us, or mere facts about a subject's psychology. My having a perception as of a table in front of me is a psychological fact; it (*pro tanto, prima facie*) supports the belief that there is a table in front of me. So does the fact that there is a table in plain view in front of me. My hearing you say that the Arctic Monkeys are playing supports my going to the concert. So does the fact that the Arctic Monkeys are playing.

According to the view I have developed in previous work (Simion 2020), epistemic reasons for belief are knowledge indicators. The fact that there is a table in front of me is a *pro tanto, prima facie* (epistemic) reason for me to believe that there is a table in front of me. It is a (*pro tanto, prima facie*) indicator that my corresponding belief that there is a table in front of me, based on the fact that there is a table in front of me, will be knowledgeable. In turn, knowledge indicators are facts that increase the objective probability of knowledge: conditional on basing beliefs on them, my beliefs are objectively more likely to be knowledgeable.

Not just any psychological facts, then, will be epistemic reasons to believe that there is a table in front of me: my having a perception as of a table will fit the bill in virtue of having the relevant indicator property. Perceptions are knowledge indicators; when I have a perception as of a table, the probability of my knowing that there's a table (conditional on proper basing) goes up. The fact that I wish that there was a table in front of me will not fit the bill, even if, unbeknownst to me, my table wishes are strongly correlated with the presence of tables: wishes are not knowledge indicators, for they don't raise the probability of knowledge. For the same reason, mere beliefs, as opposed to justified and knowledgeable beliefs, will not be evidence material; they lack the relevant indicator property.

Here is the view in full:

Reasons to Believe as Knowledge Indicators: A fact F is an epistemic reason to believe that p iff, in normal conditions, the objective probability of knowledge that p conditional on proper basing on F is higher than the unconditional objective probability of knowledge that p .

Reasons to believe are justifiers. Conversely reasons against believing are defeaters: they are facts that decrease the objective probability of knowing that p conditional on basing on them. They are indicators of ignorance:

Reasons against Belief as Indicators of Norm Violation: A fact F is an epistemic reason against believing that p iff, in normal conditions, the objective probability of ignorance that p conditional on proper basing on F is higher than the unconditional objective probability of ignorance that p .

Crucially, only some reasons to believe that p will be reasons *for a particular subject S* to believe that p : the fact that I know the Peano Axioms is not a reason for me to believe all arithmetical truths – my cognitive capacities are too limited for that. Similarly, only some reasons against believing that p will be reasons *for a particular subject S* against believing that p . A certain availability relation needs to be instantiated. The reasons in question need to be at hand for me in my epistemic environment: at hand qualitatively (they need to be the kind of things a creature like me can process), quantitatively (they need to remain within the amount of things a creature like me can process), and environmentally (they need to be easily available in my – internal or external – epistemic environment, i.e. in my mind or in my surroundings).

These available normative reasons for and against believing are, in my view, what constitutes my evidence and defeat. There is evidence for S that there is a table in front of her iff she has available to her facts that, conditional on proper basing, raise the probability of her belief that there is a table in front of her being knowledgeable. Conversely, defeaters are available indicators of ignorance: there are defeaters for S for there being a table in front of her iff she has available to her facts that lower the probability that her belief that there is a table in front of her, upon proper basing, will be knowledgeable.

Now, some evidence/epistemic reasons for me to believe and defeaters/reasons for me against believing I take up into my belief formation machinery. Some I fail to take up, although I should. What grounds this 'should', in my view, is proper epistemic functioning.⁶ Pieces of evidence are *pro tanto*, *prima facie* warrant makers: they

⁶ See e.g. (Graham 2012), (Millikan 1984), (Simion 2020).

are the proper inputs to our processes of belief formation, and when we have enough thereof, and the processes in question are properly functioning in all other ways, the resulting belief is epistemically warranted. In turn, when our belief formation processes either fail to take up warrant makers that they could have easily taken up, or they take them up but fail to output the corresponding belief, they are malfunctioning. A subject S's belief formation process P is malfunctioning epistemically if S has sufficient evidence supporting p that is available to be taken up via P and P fails to output a belief that p .

The proper function of belief formation processes, then, on my view, is input dependent: failing to take up the right inputs – whether it occurs by taking up the wrong inputs, or by failing to take up the right inputs – is an instance of malfunctioning.

One illuminating analogy here is the proper functioning of the lungs: as opposed to functional traits whose proper function is not input-dependent (e.g. hearts can function properly in vats with orange juice,⁷ even though they fail to pump blood), what it is for our lungs to function properly is, partly, for them to take up the right amount of the right stuff, i.e. oxygen, from the environment. Lungs that fail to do so are improperly functioning – whether they fail via taking up carbon dioxide, or by just failing to take up easily available oxygen.

Our cognitive systems are not like our hearts, they are like our lungs: their proper functioning is input-dependent. Cognitive systems that take up wishes as inputs are instantiating malfunctioning, just like lungs that take up carbon dioxide. Just like the lungs, then, our cognitive systems can also malfunction by not taking up easily available proper inputs. On my view, then, one way in which our belief formation processes can fail to function properly is by failing to take up easily available evidence.

Briefly going back to our sceptic: just like the wishful thinker, on this view of evidence and defeat, the sceptic has no epistemic reason to believe in her preferred skeptical hypothesis. There are no knowledge indicators available to her to this effect. There are no facts that raise the probability of knowledge of skeptical hypotheses for her. Furthermore, Moore's assertion that HANDS provides the sceptic with reasons to believe that there are hands, since Moore's testimony to this effect is a knowledge indicator: it raises the probability of knowledge that HANDS for creatures equipped cognitively like the sceptic. Also, since the sceptic's sceptical belief is not a knowledge indicator, it does not qualify as a defeater for HANDS. In this, the sceptic is in double breach of justification-conferring epistemic norm: she has unjustified sceptical beliefs, and she resists knowledge indicators on offer because of them. The sceptic does not have defeaters for HANDS/epistemic normative reasons against believing HANDS; rather, she has mere motivating reasons to this effect: facts – the fact that she believes Non-WORLD/doubts WORLD – that lead her to unjustifiably reject HANDS.

What is it, then, that explains our intuition of reasonableness in the sceptic case, and the lack thereof in the case of the wishful thinker? Recall: According to the view developed here, the sceptic ought not hold sceptical beliefs to begin with, ought to come to believe that WORLD based on Moore's argument, and thereby ought draw the inference to WORLD with Moore and abandon her antecedently held sceptical beliefs. If she fails to do all that, she is in breach of the justification-conferring epistemic norm: her resistance to Moore's argument is epistemically impermissible.

⁷ I borrow this from (Graham 2012).

Now, here is, however, a well-known fact about norms, generally speaking: sometimes, when we engage in impermissible actions, this gives rise to contrary-to-duty obligations. Consider the following normative claims:

- (1) It ought to be that John does not break the neighbour's window.
- (2) If John breaks the neighbour's window, it ought to be that he apologizes.

(1) is a *primary obligation*, saying what Jones ought to do unconditionally. In contrast, (2) is a *contrary-to-duty obligation* about (in the context of 1)) what Jones ought to do conditional on his violating his primary obligation. (1) is a norm of many sorts: social, prudential, moral, and a norm of politeness. Should John break the neighbour's window, there would be nothing good about it. That being said, John would be even worse off if, should he break the neighbour's window, he would also fail to go and apologize to the neighbour.

Our functionalist normative schema has the resources needed to explain this datum: input-independent proper functioning – of the type that governs hearts - remains a dimension of functional evaluation in its own right, independently of whether the general proper functioning of the trait in question is input-dependent or not: just like we can ask whether a heart is doing what it's supposed to do with the stuff that it takes up – be it blood or orange juice -, we can also ask whether the lungs are doing the stuff that they're supposed to do with the stuff that they have taken up – be it oxygen or carbon dioxide. There's going to be an evaluative difference, then, to be found, between two pairs of lungs that are both improperly functioning *simpliciter* – i.e. in the input-dependent sense – in that they take up the wrong kind of stuff from the environment - in terms of how they process their input gas: are they carrying the input gas through the respiratory system, and subsequently through the lining of the air sacs, to the blood cells? The pair of lungs who do are better than the pair of lungs who don't, in that, even though strictly speaking both are malfunctioning overall, the former are at least displaying input-independent proper functioning.

What explains our intuition of reasonableness in the sceptic's case, I claim, is not an epistemic norm *simpliciter*, but rather an epistemic contrary-to-duty imperative: now that the sceptic is in breach of the justification-conferring epistemic norm, the next best thing for her to do is embrace the commitments following from her unjustified beliefs, and reject the commitments that follow from their negation. The next best thing for the sceptic, now that she *believes/has a .5 credence that non-WORLD and rejects HANDS*, both impermissibly, is to reject whatever follows from HANDS. The sceptic's cognitive system, just like the wishful thinker's, and just like lungs taking up carbon dioxide from the environment, is overall malfunctioning on several counts: it takes up improper inputs (her sceptical beliefs) and rejects excellent inputs (Moore's testimony that HANDS). That being so, though, the sceptic does something right in terms of input-independent functioning: it processes the (bad) stuff that she takes up in the right way. Her cognitive system would be even worse were she, now that she *believes/has a .5 credence that non-HANDS*, go ahead and infer that WORLD.

Before I close, I would like to consider a possible objection to my view. So far, I have been assuming, with Pryor and Williamson, that the sceptic's sceptical beliefs/doubts are unjustified. One could worry though: Doesn't my view of evidence allow for the (reasonable) sceptic to have induction-based evidence for her .5 credence that non-World? After all, induction is a knowledge indicator in the

relevant sense – it raises the probability of knowledge conditional on proper basing - , and the sceptic could reason as follows: (1) When I can't tell the difference between pears and apples, I can't come to know that there's an apple in front of me; (2) When I can't tell the difference between John and his twin brother Tim, I can't come to know that John is in front of me.....(3) Therefore, when I can't tell the difference between x and y, I can't come to know that x is the case. (4) I can't tell the difference between WORLD and non-WORLD, therefore (5) I don't know that WORLD. In turn, If the sceptic believes that (5), on pain of Moorean paradoxicality, she can't believe that WORLD.

Two things about this: first, crucially, the envisaged sceptic is wrong, (3) is notably too strong: I can come to know that there's a pear in front of me in a world where there are no apples, or where apples are extremely rare, even if I can't tell the difference between pears and apples. That being said, of course, (3) may well be justified inductively, which would lead to (5) being justified inductively.

Second, though, note that Moorean paradoxicality, just like incoherence, tells us nothing about which of the two beliefs should be abandoned: it merely predicts that one needs to go. Why think WORLD needs to go, rather than (5)? Furthermore, notice that in everyday testimonial cases, it's the previously held ignorance belief that should be abandoned: I believe I don't know whether you are 32 years old, you tell me that you are 32 years old, I thereby come to know that you are 32 years old and abandon my belief that I don't know that you are 32 years old. That's how it normally goes.

Last attempt: maybe the sceptic's inductively justified belief that she can't tell the difference between WORLD and non-WORLD acts as an undercutting defeater for Moore's testimony that HANDS? This could work. The problem, though, is that undercutting defeaters need to exhibit particular strength properties in order to successfully undercut. For instance, my 3 year-old's testimony that Dretske is wrong about closure failure, because he took a hallucinogenic drug before writing 'Epistemic Operators,' will not successfully undercut my belief that closure fails based on Dretske's paper. Why not? My 3-year-old is just not a very reliable testifier on the issue – not reliable enough to undercut Dretske's written testimony, at any rate. If so, what would need to happen in the case of the sceptic for her induction-based skeptical belief to undercut Moore's testimony would be that the former is weighty enough, epistemically. Why, though, think that the sceptic's induction has such devastating epistemic effects against Moore's testimony? Also, recall that the inductive argument only warrants the reasonable skeptical belief 'I don't know that WORLD', not the anxious skeptical belief that non-WORLD.' Of course, though, the former is much weaker than the latter, and thus with much less defeat power.⁸

5. Conclusion

This paper has developed a novel, functionalist variety of radical dogmatism. I have argued that, just like the wishful thinker, the sceptic is displaying epistemic malfunction in rejecting Moore's testimony, in that she fails to pick up knowledge indicators. I have also shown, however, that the intuition that there's something reasonable about the sceptic who resists going through Moore's inference is right: the sceptic is in compliance with a contrary-to-duty obligation akin to input-independent well functioning.

⁸ Thanks to Chris Kelp for pressing me on this.

To be clear: this account, as opposed to that of the classical dogmatist, does not make any concessions to the sceptic in terms of justification-conferring epistemic norms – i.e. primary epistemic obligations: no justification for sceptical beliefs, nor any defeat against Moore’s testimony, is instantiated at the context. The account merely explains why we find the sceptic reasonable (albeit wrong) to resist Moore’s inference from HANDS to WORLD: she is in compliance with her contrary-to-duty epistemic obligations. Now that she’s broken the window, as it were, the sceptic might as well go ahead and apologize.

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