Research
​
​
​
​
Books
​
-
Simion, M. and Kelp, C. In Progress. Conceptual Engineering: The Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics of Meaning Production.(with Chris Kelp). Oxford University Press.
​
-
Simion, M. In Progress. Knowledge-First Epistemology. Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press.
​
-
Simion, M. 2024. Resistance to Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
​
-
Carter, J.A. 2024. Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence. Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press.
​
-
Kelp, C. 2023. The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press.
​
​​
Journal Special Issues​
​
-
2023. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge First Epistemology (with C. Kelp, eds.).
​
-
2022. Philosophical Studies Book Symposium on Jessica Brown's 'Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge' (with A. Carter and C. Kelp).
​​
-
2021. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology (with A. Carter, E. Gordon, C. Kelp, and J. Lyons, eds.)
​
​​
Journal Articles​
​
-
Carter, J.A. (2023). Simion and Kelp on Trustworthy AI. Asian Journal of Philosophy. Online First.
​
-
Graham, P.J. Forthcoming. The New Evil Demon Problem at 40. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
​
-
Kearl, T. Forthcoming. Knowledge-how and the Limits of Defeat. Synthese.
​
-
Kearl, T. and Wallace, R.H. Forthcoming. Agentive Modals and Agentive Modality: A Cautionary Tale. American Philosophical Quarterly.
-
Kearl, T. Forthcoming. Epistemic Control Without Voluntarism. Philosophical Issues.
​
-
Kearl, T. 2023. What We Know When We Act. Philosophical Studies. Online First.
​
-
Kearl, T. 2022. A Plea for Exemptions. Erkenntnis. Online First
​
-
Simion, M. 2023. Knowledge and Disinformation. Episteme. Online First.
​
-
​Simion, M. and Kelp, C. Linguistic Innovation for Gender Terms. Inquiry. Online First
​
-
​Simion, M. and Kelp, C. 2023. What is Trustworthiness? (with C. Kelp). Nous. Online First.​
​
-
Simion, M. 2023. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Online First.
​ Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021
In the news here and here.​​
See this MPhi blogpost by Richard Pettigrew for a Bayesian approach to this theory of evidence resistance:​
​
-
Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. 2023. Trust, Trustworthiness, and Obligation. Philosophical Psychology. Online First.
​​
-
Simion, M. and Kelp, K. 2023. Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, central piece in an invited article symposium, ed. N. Pedersen, critics: J Adam Carter, Fei Song, Shane Ryan.Online First.
​​
-
Simion, M. 2022. The Epistemic Normativity of Conjecture. Philosophical Studies 179: 3447–3471.
​​
-
Simion, M., Kelp, C. and Carter, J.A. 2022. How to Be an Infallibilist. Philosophical Studies 179(8): 2675-2682.
​​
-
Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. 2021. Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement. Synthese. 199:14641–14665.
​​
-
Simion, M. 2021. Knowledge and Reasoning. Synthese. 199: 10371–10388​​
​​
-
Simion, M. 2021. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous 55/4: 891-916.
​ Top 10 most downloaded papers in Nous for 4 years in a row (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022).
​
​
​Book Chapters
​
-
Graham, P.J. Forthcoming. What Kind of Norm is the Norm of Assertion?. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, John Turri.
-
Graham, P.J. Forthcoming. What Is Wrong with Testimony?. The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology eds. Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn.
​
-
Kelp, C. Forthcoming. Agent Functionalism. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, ed. Kurt Sylvan, Wiley-Blackwell.
​
-
Mace, L. Forthcoming. Doubting-That and Doubting-Whether. Goldberg, S. (ed.), Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford University Press.
​
-
Simion, M. Forthcoming. Knowledge Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.​
​
-
Simion, M. Forthcoming. Knowledge Still Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (eds. B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa), Wiley-Blackwell.
​
-
​Simion, M. Forthcoming. Defeat. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, ed. Kurt Sylvan, Wiley-Blackwell.
​
-
​Simion, M. Forthcoming. Epistemology. The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (ed. M. Rossberg).​
​
-
Simion, M., and Willard-Kyle, C. Forthcoming. Trusting AI: Explainability vs. Trustworthiness. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, (Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R), Oxford University Press.​
​
-
Simion, M. Forthcoming. Two Dilemmas for Value-Sensitive Technological Design. In Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, Eds. Edwards, M. and Palermos, O., Routledge.
​
-
Simion, M. ​Forthcoming. Engineering Evidence. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (eds. M.G. Isaac and K. Scharp), Springer.
​
-
Simion, M. and Kelp, C. Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion. Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Lackey J. and McGlynn A. (Eds.). Oxford University Press.
​
-
Simion, M. Conceptual Engineering. Carnap Handbuch, ed. Christian Damböck and Georg Schiemer, Metzler Verlag.
​
-
Simion, M., and Broncano-Berrocal, F. Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disagreement. Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, (M. Baghramian, A. Carder, and R. Rowland eds.), Routledge.
​
-
Simion, M., Kelp, C. and Carter, J.A. 2022. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology. Doxastic and Propositional Warrant, Paul Silva and Luis Oliveira (eds.), London: Routledge.
​
-
​Simion, M. 2022. Closure, Warrant Transmission, and Defeat. In New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure, Eds.: Jope M. and Pritchard, D. Routledge.
​
-
Simion, M. and Miragoli, M. ​2021. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement. In Group Disagreement, Carter, A and Broncano-Berrocal, F., Routledge.
​
-
​Simion, M. 2021. Assertion Compatibilism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, C. Kyriakou, C. and Wallbridge, K. (eds.), Routledge.
​
-
Simion, M. 2021. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup), Routledge.​
​
​​
Book Reviews and Symposia Contributions
​
​​
-
2003. Tanesini on Truth and Epistemic Vice. Contribution to Book Symposium on Alessandra Tanesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology', Inquiry. Online First.
​
-
2002. Review of Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, Oxford University Press 2021. Philosophical Review, 131 (4): 537–541.
​
-
​2002. Sosa on Permissible Suspension and the Proper Remit of the Theory of Knowledge. Contribution to Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa's 'Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity', Res Philosophica, 99 (4):453-466
​
-
2022. Review of Sven Rosenkranz. Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 2021. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
​
-
2021. Review of Juan Comesana, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford University Press 2020. Mind 131/523: 1007–1017​
​
​